The notion of transcendence and psychoanalysis in Karl Stern's works. 
Philosophical premises of the theories developed in order to legitimatize the treatment of mental disorders are often much clearer and more expressive than assumptions of mental health concepts, and as such, are very useful in many analyses.
There are two viewpoints from which theories of psychopathology are formulated. Proponents of naturalism believe that health and illness should be examined with the use of experimental and statistical methods. Their perspective is that of materialism (Searle, 1999, pp. 15-49) and determinism, as they maintain that mental processes can be fully described with the use of neurophysiological data only, and that each and every symptom is conditioned by changes in the somatic sphere of a human organism. If such a reason cannot be determined, temporary imperfection of the scientifi c method is to be blamed.
The other attitude is humanistic, and its proponents set themselves in opposition to naturalism. Most often, although not always, they use a phenomenological method, and they maintain that it is impossible to describe a human being only by anatomy and physiology. Authors of these interpretations have obtained interesting results in various areas of consideration, to mention Erich Fromm (1993) , Pierre Legendre (2010) , and Geza Róheim (1934) , who treat an individual as a creation of cultural institutions, which operate according to the laws of the unconscious.
Others consider personal growth as a basic human feature (Dąbrowski, 1964; Maslow, 2010) , defi ne man as Dasein, i.e. being-there or as a being which transcends himself (Binswanger, 1963; Jaspers, 1990; Frankl, 1984) .
There is one more, an eclectic group, which is represented by Karl Stern. He was one of the most versatile theoreticians of modern times, and it should be remembered that the development of philosophy and science in the twentieth century encouraged specialisation rather than versatility. Stern was active as a clinician and psychiatrist (Stern, 1954b; Stern & Malloy, 1945) , neurologist (Goldblatt, 1992; Stern & Elliot, 1949) , psychologist (Fried & Stern, 1948; Stern, 1955; Stern1975; Stern et al. 1950 Stern et al. ,1951 Stern et al. ,1953 , at the same time he referred to himself as a psychoanalyst.
Stern's experimental work, supervised by Wilder Penfi eld in The McGill Department of Psychiatry in Quebec, which was established in 1943 (Cleghorn, 1984; Bienvenue, 2010) , refl ected his thoughts on faith, religion, psychiatry and psychoanalysis. He became famous after he published the studies in which he contemplates his conversion from Judaism to Catholicism (Goldbloom, 1999; Lellote, 1954; McFarland, 2007; Neuhaus, 1988) and attempts to reconcile the Old Testament and the New Testament (Connor, 2001; Stern, 1951 Stern, , 1960 . Some intellectuals even treated Stern as a spiritual guide in this sphere (Jaki, 2000) . If fascination with psychoanalysis is added to that, two conclusions can be drawn, of which at least the latter one is rather surprising. Firstly, the ideas of this German psychiatrist are directly related to the psychotherapy, which reaches for religious and existential foundations of mental life. Secondly, Stern makes a link between the problems of transcendence and naturalistic theses of Freud's psychoanalysis. The present study focuses on this very concept of relation between Freudianism and the issues of transcendence, as it seems to be the most relevant philosophy-related problem in Stern's works. It should be remembered, however, that Stern has not been the only theoretician who studied the dialogue between religion, psychiatry and psychoanalysis; Paul Tillich and others have also been interested in this issue (Hart, 2011; Jones, 2010; Tillich, 1951 Tillich, , 1952 Tillich, , 1958 . Martin Buber, like Stern, believed that transcendence formed the process of dialogue between two subjects (Buber, 1992) .
In this work, the term "psychoanalysis" is used in the same way as Stern used it, i.e. it refers to Freudianism. Transcendence is understood as manifestation of Dasein in the act of faith.
The philosophy of Karl Stern

Three revolutions
According to Stern, the nineteenth century gave birth to three revolutions: the racist revolution, the Marxist revolution, and the Comtean revolution. The spark of this last one had been present in the European culture until the sixteenth century, and it was later transformed into a positivist shift in science (Stern, 1954b, p. 11) , as a result of which science replaced religion and removed the Christian picture of man in psychology and psychopathology. Guided by the rules of sanctity until the fi fteenth century, human life suddenly lost the sense of direction. In the nineteenth century, the truths of faith, and metaphysics along with them, were negated in biology, Marxism, and Freud's atheism (Stern, 1954b) .
Three revolutions and philosophy
According to Stern, psychological issues are very characteristic elements in the twentieth-century philosophy. Descartes, Leibniz and Kant focused mostly on physical and cosmological aspects, whereas Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, and representatives of the phenomenological-existential currents rooted their concepts in psychology. Obviously, this does not mean that there is no continuity in philosophy. There are numerous psychological elements of moral philosophy in theses by Descartes, Hume or Kant, and there is noticeable common ground for logical empiricism and the idea of mathesis universalis. Nevertheless, it was not until the twentieth century that philosophy became rooted in academic scientifi c psychology. When future generations compare the twentieth-century philosophy and that of the two preceding centuries, it will be analogous to the way in which the pre-Socratic cosmological refl ection is nowadays contrasted with the Socratic anthropological thought (Stern, 1975, p. 27-28 ) .
At the same time, the last four hundred years in philosophy have been a series of painful blows for human pride. After Copernicus had deprived the individual of his central place in the universe, human being still remained superior to animals, but Darwin damaged this belief, too, as he claimed that man was nothing more than an incidental link in the chain of development. Marx, in turn, revealed to us that all the achievements of the human species can be explained by series of economic factors, or, to put it simply, by the history of hunger (Marks) . Following all these biological and sociological blows, Freud spoke, and he told the -already traumatised European man -that his consciousness, his pride and the traditional backbone of humanity, is but a trick of dark powers of the unconscious.
Despite all these traumas, man has not ceased to attempt to solve all his problems by means of natural sciences. Such an attitude assumed by the Europeans resulted from their belief in the scientifi c data as legitimate per se, with no need to seek for something that would take them outside the border of studies of material processes. In effect, we observed a gradual decline in the importance of the human factor in science. First, there were promises of solving the problems of a human animal by socioeconomic factors, then -in Nazism -by the biological and racial ones, and fi nally the psychological factor has been announced to be the solution. It seems as if the materialist philosophy was sneaking into the inmost core of human nature. At fi rst glance, the materialist philosophy of economic justice appeared to be less harmful than the materialist interpretation of human nature. Yet, Marxist materialism (thesis) confronted the soul with matter and created something contrary to the assumptions -lack of soul (antithesis). Now, the time has come for a new synthesis to happen (Stern, 1954b) .
Science
A contemporary scholar who would choose to construct an effectively operating social system has plenty of materialist and mechanistic theories at his disposal, to mention just Pavlov's conditioning theory and Descartes' concept of human-machine. At the same time, it must be remembered that no real difference exists between treating a human being as a mere collection of refl exes, as Soviet psychiatrists preached, and considering that human being as a set of chromosomes, which was the idea of Nazi psychopathologists; both those concepts of contemporary science refl ect Comte's ideas which deprived an individual of his dignity.
Comte's idea turned out to be very popular in the sphere of the humanities. As a result, we no longer treat man as a creature that is able to communicate and we tend to forget that there are several unchangeable features of human existence, the need of transcendence being one of them. In positivist psychology, man is considered an individual, at the most. As an example, Stern recalls the enthusiasm one of his colleagues showed about a military recruitment project, in which numbers written on the conscripts' chests were used instead of their names. Reading out the names of the numbered individuals was supposed to yield surprising and promising results in the area of social engineering.
Stern expressed his amazement at the shallow empirical and pragmatic attitude to the humanities, displayed by Catholic scholars of many US universities, and at their insensitivity to the technocratic heresy. Those academics have focused mostly on instruments and devices, static procedures, surveys and other gadgets of modern psychology. Occurring under the banner of practicality of academic knowledge, such dehumanization has become a mark of our times. It results from the general methodological atmosphere which pushes scholars to enter areas in which science constitutes a depersonalizing current, something which even students of theological seminars have to face, as their curricula do not embrace such personalities as St. Francis de Sales, for instance. The triumph of naturalism has brought contemporary anthropologists to refer to the subject of their studies as an object which is set against the background of a specifi c kind of physics of social phenomena, namely the concepts developed by Pavlov, Watson and Skinner (Stern, 1954b) .
A twentieth-century philosopher was worried as he observed science usurping the right to study psychological problems, which traditionally belong to the realm of metaphysics. Scientifi c approach to the truths of faith included in it leads to their "corrosion". Metaphysics started with Newton's physics and developed with the resultant new cosmology. That physics has been closely linked with Voltaire's thought. It is the theses of modern anthropology included in both the mechanistic-psychoanalytic concept and theories of social sciences that pose the most serious threat to faith, and thus to the studies of the spiritual dimension of human psyche. Stern illustrated his thesis with a novel in which Satan and his nephew elaborate a way to buy souls -when it comes to academics, they conclude that it is easier to tempt a psychologist and sociologist than a sober-minded physicist (Lewis, 1994; Stern, 1975, p.28) .
The nineteenth century already saw science embracing the theses of metaphysics and psychology, and the atmosphere of positivism encouraged a general conviction that it was science that should study human psyche, spiritual sphere being its fundamental element. Fortunately, despite the intention of scientists, the metaphysical-scientifi c nature of psychological theses, which belong to the modern thought, opened a possibility to reach the lost Christian anthropology anew. In order to illustrate the effects of psychology-zation of metaphysics, Stern studied the contents of some notions of psychoanalysis and concluded that ingenious psychology concealed the evil idea of man, built on the basis of the Judeo-Hellenic tradition (Stern,1975, p. 29) .
Psychoanalysis, transcendence
If science is to replace faith, then the studies of the human core of all its disciplines, namely psychiatry and psychology, should play the central role in metapsychological refl ection, Stern claimed. He fi ercely criticized naturalism in modern science, in which he also placed a specifi c defi nition of psychoanalysis.
Nevertheless, there is a variant of Freudianism in which an individual is not treated as an object. Having reminded that when discussing psychoanalysis we should not contaminate it with too much of scientifi c jargon. Stern suggested to focus on the core: the drama of I and Thou, the human dialogue. When they rejected it, the communists were right in guessing that it is not compatible with the I and they relationship, as crowd leaves no room for I and Thou. In psychoanalysis, there is always a crack, which makes it possible for love and freedom to enter the procedure. Thus, it is impossible to baptize a man treated as a bundle of refl exes. The I and Thou relationship, in turn, asks to be Christianize.
When we look at the condition of contemporary man, we see his spiritual pride, which suggests the failure of the process of reducing the role of humanity in science. We know that pride should be inseparably accompanied by humility, inherent to existence. However, after four centuries of the triumph of science, we see man -who used to consider his elevated position in the universe as a result of himself being the image of God -as he gets up from the Freudian couch with less humility than ever. We do consider it a miracle that God brought God-Man to life, and equally wondrously renewed him in the twentieth century, but, in fact, man of the third revolution has lost Christ. As, according to Pascal, life without Christ as a centre of the universe induces tremendous anxiety, it seems that seeking for certainty in the scientifi c control of psyche is nothing more than a frantic search for comfort (Stern, 1954b) .
Stern postulated adopting the theory and practice of psychoanalysis without the philosophical burden of the nineteenth century, and he pointed at two sources of such discipline. The fi rst one could be described as romantic -Freud's theory is strongly infl uenced by the philosophical climate in many countries of the nineteenth-century Europe, as is expressed in Goethe's refl ection on nature. Moreover, thanks to his writings on natural sciences, Goethe became the father of modern phenomenology, as in his polemics with Newton he wanted to retain the category of occurrence in the fi elds of science and philosophy. Brentano has been Freud's philosophy tutor; Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard, and Dostoyevsky touched upon the ideas of the author of psychoanalysis. Nietzsche, for instance, used the notion of sublimation, emphasized the meaning of everyday mistakes, and his idea of will has a lot in common with the Freud's id. Nietzche's re-sentiment, similarly to Freud's neurosis, may be used by an individual to gain control over other people, so the psychoanalytical notion of illness corresponds to Adler's will to power as well (Stern, 1975, p.30) .
At the same time, psychoanalysis was being elaborated in scientifi c laboratories, and Freud began his career as a neurologist, pharmacologist, and neuropathologist, who used the language of natural sciences in his original theory. His libido is a measurable energy, which can "slip", be "channelled", "repressed" etc. Early writings by Freud, from the time when he remained under the infl uence of Charcot and Brücke, include the notion of conversion, i.e. occurrence of repressed mental content in a misleading form of a somatic symptom. In this theory, unreleased affective energy is converted into a symptom, in the same way as heat transforms into mechanic energy. As Jaspers accurately observed, such terminology is deceptive and it is only a disguise meant to look like something that belongs to experimental and quantitative sciences, whereas Freud's discovery was made with non-scientifi c methods (Stern, 1975) .
Freud wanted to arrange empirical data in a clinical summary, and he intended for his theory to provide grounds for predicting certain pathological phenomena on the basis of a given constellation of symptoms, so he often mentioned laws and mechanisms. Psychological phenomena were described with the use of terms borrowed from physics (for instance, referring to the categories of space or colour) long before psychoanalysis was born, which is of minor value in terms of epistemology. Psychoanalysis itself also makes use of the mechanistic factor all the time. For instance, a psychoanalyst will not notice that we learn nothing about music from the fact that its composer created it under the infl uence of sexual frustration. There is no doubt that Freudianism, just like anti-Cartesian psychology, is in danger of being brutally objective.
At the same time, due to some implications of the libido theory, psychoanalysis has not been compatible with the mechanistic model. When a psychoanalyst speaks about regression, he borrows a metaphor from biology, not physics. The very notion of libido has two meanings: fi rstly, it refers to desire, secondly, to fulfi lment, so it embraces love in general. Freud discusses various types of love. A child can only be loved, whereas an adult is able to give love and bear frustrations. According to Freud, a matrix of primitive, polymorphic perversion develops into mature psyche. This process cannot be explained by the semantics of embryology, just like chemistry provides no explanation for an acorn development into an oak tree.
When freed from the traps of positivism, the libido theory has a completely ant-naturalistic sense. It shows that there is an internal relation between polymorphous perversity of an infant and the adult person's gift of love. A child manifests its need to be in unity with its mother using all accessible means: eating, excretion, masturbation etc. All those phenomena may fi t the framework of a clinical description, and psychoanalysis fails when it claims the right to ask metaphysical questions which go beyond that description, which fully embraces its philosophical sense.
Mature love is fully developed in God-Man, the second person of the hypostatic union. This ideal human form is in fact foreseen, though not directly, in the natural order. We are invited to see it as a personifi ed and historic form. In fact, it is highly possible that future generations will see psychoanalysis free from the burden of the nineteenth-century superstructure and join the wider group of Christian anthropologies. Stern discussed the possibility of considering such psychoanalysis as compatible with Teilhard de Chardin's concept.
Freud's theory of libido should be interpreted as an active and organizing energy, Aristotelian entelechy. That last notion may in fact link various concepts of man, and in the case of psychoanalysis it may lead to understanding his gradual development. At the beginning of that process, man is just a mouth and a libidinal gastrula, and at the end of it, he is a transcending person.
In psychoanalysis, id is a sum of instincts, and superego is a set of forces which suppress it, the latter is often treated as conscience. The power play between id and superego may be understood in a mechanistic way, which is necessary to explain numerous clinical phenomena, but at the same time, such mechanics will not work when it comes to studying the world of values. Theses of psychoanalysis show that the notion of moral good may occur in the realm of psychology, even if this science is formulated in opposition to value judgments (Stern, 1954b (Stern, , 1975 .
As has been commonly interpreted, Freud's Moses and Monotheism proposed a thesis that God had not been careful enough when he had given conscience to man, and now most people do not pay attention to its demands. Stern refers to Racker's opinion, which explains cultural superego in a different way: conscience does not seem to care about the integrity of human psyche, and as a result man faces a dilemma whether to engage in revolutionary fi ght against oppressive culture or suffer being its part. Freud did not neglect conscience, but he admonished people that they ignore its call a lot. Such an attitude was an effect of his clinical refl ection, whose integral part was his lack of approval of too strict superego, due to which the unused surplus of sexual impulse would lead man towards the revolution, which could be achieved with the use of psychopathic and perverse means.
Stern rightly observed that treatment required adoption of some conceptual framework, even if its axiological dimension raised doubts in the therapist. It is not easy for an individual to accept the autonomy of the sphere of moral values, and doctors popularize easy relativism in an attempt to minimize the effort to make diffi cult ethical choices, which in their opinion brings about unnecessary suffering.
The truth is that it is impossible to perform clinical work without the Freudian understanding of superego, and the natural history of morality shed light not only on the route set by the suppressions of early childhood and civilization, on the world of love and fairness, but also on the way in which they are accepted or rejected by people. For instance, oppressive effects of Jansenism and Puritanism and their morality cannot be treated today without psychoanalytical insight, thanks to which we learn that asceticism, when not accompanied by love, is able to create only a codifi ed morality of fear. All the phenomena with which repression occurs become understandable when we study the underlying forces (Stern, 1954b (Stern, , 1975 .
The antisocial world of revolution and crime can be studied in the very same way. Psychoanalysis also teaches us that in order to treat, a doctor must learn about his own limitations -he may not judge the patient, but has to accept his hostility with no desire to reciprocate it. As he theorized as a philosopher, Freud hardly had any infl uence on the contemporaneity. His concept became signifi cant for the sphere of culture only as long as it was empirical, not theoretical. As an empirical discipline, psychoanalysis does not examine the anonymous scientifi c I and it, but the I and THOU relationship (Stern, 1954b, p. 297) . Such anthropological perspective is rooted in dialogue and in the sense that God is in fact present in two subjects, which is expressed in the THOU-SELF formula (Stern, 1975, p. 27) .
At present, the status of the humanities is a major problem of philosophy, as they have been replacing religion, which used to place transcendence as part of the plan of creation. All modern philosophies, which abandoned Christianity as the core of their content have already been in decline, which means that they no longer engage in the discussion of topics that are fundamental for the human condition. At the same time, even the great atheists of the nineteenth century (Nietzsche, Marx, Freud) revealed frustration of great moralists, permeated with prophetic fury. After all, Marx' opinion that "religion is the opium of the people" (Marx, 1981, p. 8) was directed against those who take advantage of the poor under the guise of faith. In his concept of religion as a form of mass neurosis, Freud expressed criticism of dogmatically fossilized faith, which long ago ceased to be a problem for theoreticians. Lacking the notion of spirit, modern scientism has been far from metaphysical sources of refl ection (Stern, 1975) .
For a scientist, it is impossible that two subjects may appear at the same time and in the same place. It becomes viable in the I and THOU relation thanks to empathy, a kind of co-naturalness of both subjects which makes mutual interpretation of their existence possible. Unlike I and you or I and they, the I and THOU relation naturally refers to love and it cannot be neutral as such. Objects in geometrical space are not only separated from one another, but their character is unknown, whereas the I and Thou relation is a dazzling insight, in which the light of reason and grace belong to each other and carry a metaphysical quality with them (Stern, 1975 ).
It appears clear from the above that human communication has been a basic problem for Stern. As one of its variants, the psychotherapeutic process relates both to the issue of transcendence and communication. It is not true that faith provides absolute protection from neurosis. If complete redemption was possible, neither neurosis nor any other illness would exist. Christ referred to those who were afraid, as "you of little faith", and he knew the terror of the agony of the darkest night himself. However, it should also be remembered that replacing faith with psychotherapy would mean that all human problems could be solved by means of conversation, which is not true. The theory of collectivism, which is used as a technique of life in a void left after secularism, and which remains at confl ict with the spirit of therapeutic conversation, proposes a special kind of dialogue, a form of I and they relation (Stern, 1954b) .
While science lays claim to being the rebirth of Godcreator, psychoanalysis may be the resurrection of God-redeemer. Contemporary science that ignored such a possibility would lead to rejecting a step towards personalism. It would not be merely a trivial academic mistake, but a philosophical catastrophe. Psychoanalysis may become a turning point in the history of all sciences. In his theory, Freud discovered the unity of man and the fact that a mental phenomenon was always direct and experienced via poetic insight, thanks to which we found in it the polarization of love and hatred in a form of dialogue. In the psychoanalytic process, the healing principle is established beyond the senses -it is the world of Grace, a unique image of psyche (Stern, 1975) .
Phenomenology, transcendence
While he saw psychoanalysis as an opportunity to break the naturalist deadlock of modern psychopathology, Stern neglected the fact that it had already developed its humanistic direction basing on phenomenology. Here, it should be said that if Brentano was really Freud's tutor in philosophy, he was a bad teacher, as his student did not manage to surpass him in the area of phenomenology, if not in the sphere of philosophy in general (Gellner, 1997, pp. 11-33) . The infl uence of phenomenology on the author of psychoanalysis has been a subject of polemics (Rosińska, 2010, pp. 131-146 ).
Stern did not focus much on phenomenology, and made only a few, relatively insignifi cant remarks: he stated that it provided a description of mental processes, but not the (read: desired) interpretation which psychoanalysts attached to case histories. Phenomenology has been ineffective as a method of treatment, and often it amounted to just describing, comparing and labelling (Stern. 1954b, p.47) . There is a petitio principii fallacy in such generalities, and the remarks on psychotherapy are counterfactual, which may become a subject of further studies.
Transcendence according to Victor Frankl
In order to fully understand Stern's concept of transcendence, one should confront it with the humanistic and phenomenological stance. That was represented by Victor Frankl, who distinguished between two kinds of transcendence. The fi rst was the absolute transcendence of God. It was paradoxical, as it occured together with His absolute intimacy. In other words, God has been infi nitely distant from existence and indefi nitely close to it at the same time. Frankl was mainly interested in existential transcendence.
It may be found in a special kind of healing contact, namely logotherapy. Its task is to give meaning to the unavoidable suffering of man. When this meaning is subjectively recognized and understood, the individual gains freedom. In order to be able to offer the sense of meaning to a patient, one needs to have a certain concept of humanity, but modern thought about man degenerates in many dimensions which Frankl dubbed as "-isms" that converge in the notion of nihilism.
Generally speaking, contemporary nihilists deny the existence its transcendental dimension, and claim that man has become a nobody. The crisis of the concept of man deepens in case of anthropologists who announce that man has become everything. As a result, anthropology becomes degenerate when its scholars limit their interest to what they consider purely human, namely existence, and they omit, like nihilists do, the issue of transcendence, which is fundamental for an individual (Frankl, 1984, p. 91) . Thus, in idealistic philosophy, existence is neither able to catch things in itself, nor to catch itself, and the fact that "a subject has and maintains his existence, and an object has and maintains its transcendence in the same way" (ibid., p. 182).
Nihilism erased existential depth and uniqueness from the picture of man, and anthropological thinking should be careful not to do likewise, namely no to deprive man of transcendence. Without transcendence, many phenomena of life could never be explained, creativity for instance. By limiting man to what is immanent in him, anthropologists fall into the trap of anthropocentrism -the fabric of the theodicy, which is an attempt to explain God via human motifs. In that case, when immanence is neglected, human suffering cannot be explained without falling into anthropomorphism.
When an individual is placed in an only-human world, an attempt to reduce the meaning of suffering to meta-clinical notions only opens further questions, because the life score of a suffering man fi nds fulfi lment only in transcendence. It is an essential factor of spiritual constitution of man, as it creates in him an objective meaning, a super-meaning which co-creates an individual. Frankl stated that the "essence of human existence" (ibid., p. 147) lay in the fact that man was open to the world and self-transcended himself. In other words, to be human means to be directed towards something or someone, to be dedicated to the work to which we devote ourselves, to the man whom we love, to God whom we serve. Transcendence is not the same as intention. The fi rst one catches what is hidden within a symbol, whereas the latter one seeks for what is open, manifest.
Thus, all monadical concepts of conscience prove disappointing, and neuropsychological, behavioural, refl ex-based, and psychoanalytical theories describe the states, which occur in the "lower dimensions" of conscience. The word "lower" means here, in Frankl's concept, the same as: simpler, psychological, etc., while "transcendent" means the same as primary, or original, in an ontological sense. This dimension of the psychological theory is missing in psychoanalysis not because Freud was aware of the naturalistic limitations to his theory, but because he reduced it to these limitations. Psychoanalysis announces the existence of ego drives, which are genetically rooted in id, which in turn is composed of ego drives. As a result, a psychoanalyst treats man as a being characterized mainly by drives (ibid., p. 35).
When he treated psychoanalysis as science -and he was both wrong and inconsistent in doing so -Frankl stated that it could not be logically confl icting or non-confl icting with faith, because it referred to a different order than faith. The order of facts is examined by science, while the order of transcendence is the subject of phenomenological studies, and it is pointless to attempt to mould one the same way as the other. Psychoanalysis will never be humanistic, and phenomenology will not become scientifi c. Personal aspect is not signifi cant in psychoanalysis, and if there are any therapeutic effects, they are incidental, and should be treated as a side effect of the whole analytical procedure (ibid., p. 33).
According to Frankl, psychoanalysis is one of psychologisms of the present day. A psychoanalyst transfers the picture of an individual's spiritual life onto the mental plane, and achieves a fl at picture of man who is treated as a game of mental forces here. This picture is often presented in the form of psychopathology. Theoreticians who represent this viewpoint often diagnosed Christ with delusion of grandeur, because he considered himself as God. When asked in the psychological language, metaphysical questions are troublesome, and answers to them remind an attempt to replace Rembrandt's masterful use of light and shade with an anatomical diagram. Those who ask them do not know that the philosophical idea of man contains non-reducible meaning of the undiscovered, i.e. of truth.
Because of the psychologistic rejection of the world of objective values as constituting man, a theoretician begins to see pleasure as the dominant motif of mental life. However, pleasure does not mean an intentional end of activity, but is its unintended effect at the most. All intentions to achieve pleasure destroy it, and the real intention refers only to the world of values.
In psychoanalysis, the intentionality of human existence is also negated by the biologist category of drives, which apparently prompt action. Human activity is aimed at the value, and it only uses the energy of drives, but does not satisfy the value. As he analyses drives, a psychoanalyst can see only the energy of motives. When they state that motives undergo sublimation, psychoanalysts do accept the existence of values, but they immediately add that these values are formed from motives by way of sublimation. Frankl compared such reasoning to speaking about a river which was able to build a water-power plant all by itself.
Psychologism, as a manifestation of intellectual decay, is a reason for endless discussions and fi ght among schools of psychology. Reducing subjectivity to id and depriving an individual of her/his human dignity is one of the determinants of the psychoanalytical procedure. Eventually, psychoanalysis is a sin against the spiritual person of man (ibid., pp. 38-39) . In Freudian perspective, the I and thou relation becomes an anonymous id and self one, in which I does not contribute anything of her/his own, and she/he only says to the other person that this person is no longer loved. Psychologically, only striving and powers are visible, whereas the central category of meaning-oriented psychology is love, a feeling directed at an individual who embodies certain general values. Psychoanalysts know nothing about it.
Highly abstract, and transferring some notions to the sphere of practical psychotherapy, Frankl's thought was not free from certain stresses. In order to avoid the awkwardness of the notion of "the essence of existence", we can refer to transcendence as an existential and specifi c movement of Dasein towards meaning and then super-meaning. The fi rst part of this movement may be described as intentionality.
Frankl, Stern, Freud. A summary
Martin Buber searched for a fundamental diffi culty in Stern's idea of God-Man. That German psychiatrist solved the theological aspect of this problem by recognizing the divinity of Christ. There was still the existential aspect, namely the question about the form of dialogue, which allows for transcendence. Stern suggested psychoanalysis here, well prepared for that purpose, let us add. In order to give a humanistic dimension to Freud's clinical method, Stern mechanically added to it a notion which might be described as growth in transcendence, or development towards Christ.
Stern continually assured us that there were things that should be added to Freud's theory and things that should be deleted from it in order for it to become a corpus of humanistic statements. This would be a caricature of a certain consequence of Goedel's laws: if we want to formulate a theory, then by deducing and/or adding any discretional ideas to it and obtaining a system of contradictory premises, we will obtain any discretional theory. Including a contradict theory, to make it clear. This is why Stern rejected science and accepted philosophy in positivism, and he did the opposite thing in psychoanalysis, namely he accepted science and negated philosophy. The problem lies in the distance between psychoanalysis and science, which is more or less the same as between positivism and Christian philosophy, and Freudian psychoanalysis taken as a whole is not suitable to be humanized in Stern's way.
Firstly, even Freud frantically tried to naturalize his theory, and he evoked a lot of consternation when doing so. Stern implicite treated psychoanalysis as a tool for understanding the whole experimental psychology, tainted with the mark of naturalism. If psychoanalysis really was such a hermeneutical passkey, Freud would seriously have had to consider the methodological assumption of the directions of modern psychology mentioned above, whereas in fact he neglected them (Grünbaum, 2004, pp. 113-114) .
As far humanism is concerned, he did not even see the need to use humanistic concepts in his theory. When Binswanger argued, rather gently, that naturalism in the psychological theory was too narrow and one-sided, Freud admired his beautiful language and good manners and stated that nevertheless "he was not convinced" (Binswanger, 1957, p. 96) . This, undoubtedly, is the effect of treating naturalism and its consequences as a sort of ideology that is binding for a scientist. As a result, Freud put the phenomena which Stern wanted to add to the realm of psychoanalysis, for instance art and religion, at one of high storeys of the building of human psyche, whereas he himself, as a scientist focused on the basement and sewage in this very edifi ce (ibid., p. 97).
Thus, it should be emphasized that Stern's extremely humanistic interpretation of Freudianism was inaccurate. According to Freud, psychoanalysis was to treat symptoms, which result from the manifestations of childhood libido fi xations in adult life. There is an unbreakable principle in psychoanalysis, according to which the polymorphically perverse past of an individual, full of "gluttonous" lust, returns in the form of symptoms of illness, and all the loves of an adult man are stamped with the mark of the oedipal phase. In Freudian psychology, the crowning of human growth has little in common with the spiritual sphere, and it is called a genital phase.
According to Freud's ontogenetic theory, man retains in his unconsciousness the traces of the strongest experiences, which in psychoanalysis have the literal meaning of sexual traumas, and there is no symbolism there. It does mean that man has an unconscious memory of the primal scene, but apart from stating that Darwinian primal horde has not been found, Freud did not provide evidence for the murder of the father by sons to be a human act in any way (Freud, 1967c) . What is certain is that a given event from the biological past of man sets a direction for cultural progress.
Secondly, if we wish to humanize psychoanalysis, we should do it not on the ground of the clinical theory, but on the ground of Freudian meta-psychology and philosophy. In its clinical layer, psychoanalysis is a kind of psychotherapy. Some authors point at the links between practitioners and psychotherapy (Kuchan, 2011) . Stern also knew them, and in his writing about Freud he mistook the controversial effectiveness of psychotherapy for the possibility to denaturalize Freud's theory.
If we follow Stern's advice and deduce from psychoanalysis the notions which he treats as burden, we will not obtain communication, but rather primitive psychologistic therapy, where two kinds of data are important: information about amorphous biological drives and the strict and punishing superego. We will not know how to translate biology into the aggressive language of conscience, because for such translation Freud's meta-psychology and philosophy would have to be used, and Stern wanted to delete these two components of psychoanalysis.
Finally, if we want to humanize psychoanalysis, we defi nitely should not do this basing on the notion of transcendence. Freud's understanding of the problems of faith, as presented in his philosophical writings, was archaic in its psychologism. God is an internalized father fi gure, the peak of mental development, and it is in the psychological moment of guilty conscience that man refers to it, not in existential transcendence. Contrary to what Stern suggested, superego was not conscience (Freud, 1967a (Freud, , 1967b .
Psychotherapy, with its strong notion of the unconscious, may of course be linked with faith but such syntheses will not work with Freudianism. At the same time, Stern suggested that faith was something more than psychotherapy, then he claimed it is something different, and then he stated that it may, but did not have to, be the same. Finally, Stern announced that we would fi nd the truths of faith in the psychoanalytical procedure.
In Frankl's phenomenological tradition, the process of healing was a manifestation of existential qualities of both the patient and the doctor. This is why at some point of the therapy he conducted, there appeared a refl ection on transcendence as a kind of an existential, a specifi c activity of Dasein. Viewed from such a perspective, transcendence is not a psychological peak of development to which the notion of communication has been attached for some unclear reason, but it is a metaphysical condition of the conscience, which permeates the development and other mental phenomena.
The fact that, as a result of deleting from psychoanalysis the theses which may be related to naturalism, Stern obtained non-psychoanalysis in the synthesis did not mean that his concept has not been worth our attention. We need to remember that Stern's picture of psychology full of "gadgets" often happens to be an accurate refl ection of reality (Jaspers, 1990, p. 419) . Thus, he focused his refl ection around the beautifully expressed thesis about the special act of deifying man by God, namely creation of God-Man. In a metaphysical sense this happened by placing Christ in the centre of the spiritual space of an individual. At the same time, due to that, God may only be reached in the process of communication with man, by discovering Christ in another person. One might obviously raise an objection that it is rather risky to replace a defective science with a healthy non-science, but we do need to remember about this option in our discussions on humanism and naturalism.
In his concept, Stern voiced two deeply humanistic needs, namely the need for contact with man and the need for contact with God-Man. To satisfy the former one, he needed psychoanalysis, and to satisfy the latter one, he needed gospel. Both those needs merge into one, and they form a basic, transcendent movement of homo metaphysicus towards God.
Stern was a Christian man, who wanted to read the Bible as a whole from religious perspective, and he chose Catholicism to realize this conciliatory idea. He considered it to be most signifi cant in the act of rebuilding the importance of the notion of transcendence, and criticized it when it failed. The failure of Catholicism is visible in dehumanization of an individual in the place where her/his human dimension should play the greatest role, in the heart of the system of sciences, namely the humanities. Stern's concept was a prayer, full of straining, said by someone who was a humanist and a scientist at the same time.
